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THE AVAILABILITY OF ANTITRUST TREBLE DAMAGES FOR
COMMODITIES MARKET MANIPULATION
INTRODUCTION
In 1976, two of the largest potato processors in the country conspired
to manipulate the Maine potato futures market.' They hoped that by
creating the appearance of a large supply, potato prices would drop.
Consistent with this theory, they purchased an enormous amount of
"short" contracts, thus obligating themselves to sell millions of pounds of
potatoes that they could not deliver.' This created a false impression
that large supplies of potatoes were available and prices fell dramati-
cally.3 Ordinarily, they would have either had to offset their positions by
purchasing an equal amount of "long" contracts, or make actual deliv-
ery. They did neither.4 The largest default in the history of commodities
futures trading followed.5 The low prices had devastating effects on both
producers and investors.6
From 1979 to 1980, silver prices fluctuated drastically because of an
alleged conspiracy by several large investors, led by the Hunt brothers, to
corner the world silver market.7 A congressional investigation revealed
that the episode destabilized the entire futures industry and the securities
markets, disrupted industrial and commercial operations, contributed to
the inflationary spiral, and potentially jeopardized the financial well-be-
ing of futures commission merchants, their parent companies, the futures
exchanges, clearinghouses and banks.'
The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)9 expressly prohibits this com-
modity market price manipulation.10 The Sherman Act"1 outlaws con-
1. See Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22, 23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 527 (1985); Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 285 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
2. See Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
106 S. CL 527 (1985).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 23.
6. Id. at 25.
7. H.R. Rep. No. 565, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-62, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 3871, 3910-11.
8. Id. at 66, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3871, 3915.
9. Commodities Exchange Act, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as amended at
7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982)).
10. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13(b), 13b (1982). The CEA contains numerous provisions
designed to prevent or punish manipulation of the price of any commodity in interstate
commerce or any exchange traded commodity futures contract. For instance, the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) will not designate a board of trade as a
contract market unless "the governing board thereof provides for the prevention of ma-
nipulation of prices and the cornering of any commodity by the dealers or operators upon
such board." Id. § 7(d). "The Commission is authorized... to direct the contract mar-
ket, whenever it has reason to believe that an emergency [threatened or actual market
manipulations and corners] exists, to take such action as... is necessary to maintain or
restore orderly trading in or liquidation of any futures contract .... - Id. § 12a(9). In
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spiracy to restrain trade.' 2 The Supreme Court has interpreted "restraint
of trade" to include conspiracy to manipulate markets.13 Consequently,
some activity will violate both statutes.' 4 Whether the same conduct is
actionable under both statutes, however, invites question. This question
is particularly important because the CEA limits recovery for violations
of the Act to actual damages, 5 while the antitrust laws provide for treble
damages. 6
Courts have split on whether Congress intended the antitrust laws to
regulate commodity market manipulation.' 7 One district court held that
the "specific remedy" rule precluded application of the Sherman Act and
limited plaintiffs to the CEA action.' 8 That court distinguished its analy-
sis from implied repeal of the antitrust laws.' 9 The Second Circuit, in
Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exchange,20 rejected this distinction, rea-
soning that to give effect to congressional intent in these cases, courts
addition, the act makes it a felony to manipulate or attempt to manipulate commodities
prices. See id. § 13(b).
11. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-
7 (1982)).
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
13. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
14. See, e.g., Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22, 23-24 (2d Cir.)
(conspiracy to drive down Maine potato futures prices), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 527
(1985); Strax v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 936, 938-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (con-
spiracy to corner silver market); Pollock v. Citrus Assocs., 512 F. Supp. 711, 715-17
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (conspiracy to manipulate prices of orange juice futures); Smith v.
Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 107 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (conspiracy to "bucket" orders for soy-
bean futures); see also 2 P. Johnson, Commodities Regulation § 5.34, at 292-93 (1982)
(manipulation and monopoly power are similar concepts, so not surprising antitrust laws
are sometimes used in commodity market manipulation cases).
15. See 7 U.S.C. § 25(a), (b) (1982).
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
17. Compare Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 116-17 (N.D. Il. 1979) (antitrust
treble damages not available for commodity market manipulation) with Strobl v. New
York Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22, 29-30 (2d Cir.) (antitrust treble damages are avail-
able for commodity market manipulation), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 527 (1985), Gold-
schmidt v. Hunt, 556 F. Supp. 123, 124 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (same), Strax v. Commodity
Exch., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 936, 940-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same) and Pollock v. Citrus As-
socs., 512 F. Supp. 711, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same). Commentators have split also.
Compare 2 T. Russo, Regulation of the Commodities Futures and Options Markets
§ 19.13, at 19-41 to -43 (1984) (Congress intended plaintiffs to be able to pursue antitrust
claims for commodity market manipulation) with 2 P. Johnson, supra note 14, § 5.34
(antitrust claims should either be dismissed or referred to the CFTC for reconciliation
with the CEA).
18. See Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 116-17 (N.D. Il1. 1979).
19. Plaintiffs mischaracterize the issue as whether the 1974 amendments to the
CEA impliedly repealed the antitrust laws .... But the question we face is
merely whether plaintiffs may pursue different remedies, one which is aimed at
the precise conduct alleged to have been committed by defendants, and the
other which is aimed at a universe of conduct, of which defendants' alleged acts
constitute just a small set.
Id.
20. 768 F.2d 22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 527 (1985).
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must allow plaintiffs to pursue their antitrust claims .2  Strobl arose out
of the manipulation of the potato futures market.22 The large-scale de-
fault on numerous delivery contracts disrupted the market,23 producing
much litigation.24 In Strobl, the plaintiff successfully pleaded both CEA
antimanipulation and antitrust causes of action. 2s The decision, how-
ever, concerned individual traders26 with no duty to self-regulate under
the CEA; an award of antitrust damages therefore did not conflict with
CEA purposes. The holding should be limited to such traders, and not
applied to exchanges acting in conformity with, for example, rules ap-
proved by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
This Note discusses whether parties can maintain both CEA and anti-
trust causes of action arising from the same conduct. Part I suggests a
framework for analyzing this problem, reconciling implied repeal with
the specific remedy rule. In Part II that framework will be used to de-
termine whether Congress intended the antitrust laws to apply to
commodity market manipulation. Part III examines the public policy
considerations of allowing antitrust actions for commodities violations.
This Note concludes that antitrust treble damages should be available in
commodity market manipulation actions.
I. DEVELOPING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The controversy over whether the antitrust laws apply in commodity
market manipulation cases stems largely from confusion over implied re-
peal and the specific remedy rule.
A. Implied Repeal
When a court finds a statute repealed by implication, it refuses to allow
a cause of action that would otherwise be available.2" Implied repeal
21. See id. at 30.
22. Id at 23.
23. Id. at 24-25.
24. See, eg., National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 470 F. Supp.
1256, 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd sub nor. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980),
afl'd sub nom. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353
(1982).
25. See Strobl, 768 F.2d at 30-3 1.
26. See id. at 23.
27. In some cases, an act is completely repealed by another. "[W]here two acts are
not in express terms repugnant, yet if the latter act covers the whole subject of the first,
and embraces new provisions, plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute for the
first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act." United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. (I I Wall.)
88, 92 (1870). In other cases, the repeal is more specific. For instance, the antitrust laws
have been impliedly repealed by various statutes for limited purposes, see. eg., Terminal
Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 297 U.S. 500, 514-15 (1936) (Interstate Commerce
Act); United States Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 485 (1932) (Shipping
Act), but they have survived in general and remain applicable to most other situations
where the act complained of falls within their confines. See Hughes Tool Co. v. TVA,
409 U.S. 363, 387, 389 (1973).
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hinges on interpretation of congressional intent.28 A law is impliedly
repealed when it defeats the purpose of a later enacted law.29 A strong
presumption operates against finding implied repeal3" because statutes
should be read together to give effect to the legislative policies of both.3'
Hence, courts require clear evidence that the legislature intended the
statute not to apply before they will infer its repeal.32 When courts find a
repeal of the antitrust laws, it is because of an obvious conflict with an-
other statute.33
One kind of conflict is based on the "exclusive jurisdiction" of an ad-
ministrative agency.34 When a party challenges the conduct of a member
of a regulated industry under the antitrust laws, courts sometimes find
28. See St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 787-
88 (1981); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189 (1978); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550
(1974); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939); Posadas v. National City
Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).
29. See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1939). Thus, where the
policy benefits of enforcing one law outweigh the policy costs of displacing another, the
competing statutes have to be reconciled. See S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transp. Ass'n of Am.,
191 F.2d 658, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 955 (1952). Implied repeal
accomplishes that. ABA Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments 599, 600-02 (2d
ed. 1984).
30. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) (repeals by implications
not favored). "Repeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are
strongly disfavored, and have only been found in cases of plain repugnancy between the
antitrust and regulatory provisions." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 350-51 (1963) (footnote omitted); see Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines,
Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973).
31. See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939); Prewitt v. United
States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 304 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Green, 494 F.2d
820, 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1004 (1974).
32. National Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 389 (1981); Posadas v.
National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936); United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421
F.2d 92, 102 (9th Cir. 1970).
33. See United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719-20 (1975);
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963).
34. The conflict was described succintly in S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transp. Ass'n of Am.,
191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 955 (1952):
"The Sherman Act... and related laws represent an attempt to keep the chan-
nels of competition free so that prices and services are determined by the work-
ings of a free market." Regulation of a specific industry, on the other hand,
"evidences congressional recognition that competition can assure protection of
the public interest only in an industrial setting which is conducive to a free
market and can have no place in industries which are monopolies because of
public grant, the exigencies of nature, or legislative preference for a particular
way of doing business." The aircraft industry, like railroads and power, is one
in which Congress had decided that the public interest is best served, not by free
competition, but rather by direct and uniform regulation by an "agency author-
ized to supervise almost every phase of the regulated company's business."
Id. at 661 (quoting Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 193
F.2d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (footnotes omitted); see McLean Trucking Co. v. United
States, 321 U.S. 67, 79-86 (1944). However, even finding substantial regulation is not
sufficient to infer intent to repeal the antitrust laws with respect to every action taken
within the industry. National Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 389
(1981).
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that Congress intended the governing regulatory agency to have exclu-
sive authority to oversee the conduct." Disputes arising from that activ-
ity should be settled with regard to the applicable statute, not the
antitrust laws.36 The regulatory agencies, and not the courts, have the
requisite expertise for setting standards and determining if they have
been met.3 7 Were aggrieved parties allowed to seek judicial relief for an-
titrust violations "without resort in the first instance to the [appropriate]
regulatory commission, the unity of the system of regulation [would
break] down beyond repair."3
A second conflict arises out of the self-regulatory nature of an industry
such as commodities or securities trading.3 9 Self-regulation reduces com-
petition." For instance, in the commodities industry, trades must be ex-
ecuted by registered members41 of various licensed exchanges.42 These
exchanges have their own rules limiting membership43 and trading proce-
dures.' Thus, nonmembers cannot compete freely in the markets.
When exchange rules, orders or procedures have been challenged under
the antitrust laws,45 exemption has been allowed in cases in which the
policies underlying self-regulation would be furthered.46
35. See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 305-06 (1963)
(Civil Aeronautics Board given exclusive jurisdiction over allocation of airline routes);
United States Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 485 (1932) (Shipping Board
given exclusive jurisdiction over combination in restraint of trade); Keogh v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 164 (1922) (Interstate Commerce Commission given exclusive
jurisdiction over railroad rate fixing scheme).
36. See eg., Pan Am. World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 313 & n.19
(1963) (antitrust claim dismissed in deference to Federal Aviation Act); United States
Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 485 (1932) (antitrust claim dismissed in defer-
ence to Shipping Act); Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 162 (1922) (antitrust
claims dismissed in deference to Interstate Commerce Act).
37. See e.g., Hughes Tool Co. v. TWA, 409 U.S. 363, 387-88 (1973); United States
Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 485 (1932).
38. Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 297 U.S. 500, 513 (1936); see
United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 734-35 (1975); S.S.W., Inc.
v. Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 191 F.2d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert denied, 343 U.S.
955 (1952).
39. See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 303-04 (1973); Silver v.
New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 349 (1963).
40. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 349 (1963); Smythe, Govern-
ment Supervised Self Regulation in the Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws" Sug-
gestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C.L. Rev. 475, 476, 479 (1984); Johnson, Antitrust
in the Commodities Field- After Gordon, 6 Hofstra L. Rev. 115, 117-18 (1977); Note,
Commodity Exchanges" The Case for Antitrust Immunity, 12 J. Legis. 80, 81 n.9 (1985).
41. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6d-6f, 6h, 6k, 6n (1982).
42. See id. §§ 7, 7a, 7b, 8.
43. See 1 P. Johnson, supra note 14, § 1.06, at 14-15.
44. See id. §§ 2.86-87, at 350-51.
45. See e.g., Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113, 113-14 (1973) (per
curiam) (claims that the exchange had forced the sale of commodities futures contracts at
artificial prices and had failed to exercise due care in halting manipulative conduct); Ricci
v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 298-99 (1973) (claim that exchange arbitrar-
ily transferred a membership).
46. See Seligson v. New York Produce Exch., 378 F. Supp. 1076, 1104 (S.D.N.Y.
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Congress did not intend the industries to be completely immune from
antitrust laws, however. On the contrary, the "guiding principle" for
reconciling the antitrust laws with a regulatory statute is that "[r]epeal is
to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make the [regulatory act]
work, and even then only to the minimum extent necessary."
47
B. The Specific Remedy Rule
Overlapping statutes, as opposed to conflicting ones, 48 may be recon-
ciled under the specific remedy rule. When a general statute is compre-
hensive enough to include the situation for which a provision of another
statute specifically affords a remedy, courts will apply the special provi-
sion alone.49 The general provision will apply when the specific provi-
sion does not.50
This rule creates a logical shortcut to determining legislative intent.5 '
The rule presumes that by specifically addressing a certain situation,
Congress intended to create an exception to the general statute. But the
rules does not apply where clear evidence shows Congress did not want
the general provision displaced.52
Implied repeal and the specific remedy rule involve opposite presump-
tions: Do not assume that one statute impliedly repeals another in the
absence of clear legislative intent. Assume that a specific statute dis-
places a more general one in the absence of clear legislative intent. The
primary goal of statutory interpretation-following the intent of the leg-
1974); cf Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 689-90 (1975) (securities
case); Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 757 F.2d 676, 695 (5th
Cir. 1985) (same); Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 633 F.2d 65, 70 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981) (same); Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 356 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 948 (1978) (same); Harding v. American Stock Exeh., Inc.,
527 F.2d 1366, 1368-70 (5th Cir. 1976) (same); Cowen v. New York Stock Exch., 256 F.
Supp. 462, 467-68 (N.D.N.Y. 1966), afl'd, 371 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1967) (same).
The CEA may preclude antitrust action where the CFIC has approved an exchange
rule. See 88 Stat. 1395, § 107 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 19 (1982)).
47. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963). The Silver holding
applies to commodities regulation. See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289,
300-02 (1973).
48. The situation addressed in this Note is one of overlap, not conflict, because the
statutory provisions in question cover the same conduct, market manipulation. See supra
notes 9-14.
49. See, e.g., Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & School Lands, 461 US.
273, 285 (1983); Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 834 (1976); Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973).
50. See D. Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932); Kepner v. United
States, 195 U.S. 100, 125 (1904); Buffum v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 192 F.2d 58, 61 (7th Cir.
1951) (quoting Kepner, 195 U.S. at 125), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 944 (1952)).
51. See American Medical Ass'n v. Mathews, 429 F. Supp. 1179, 1196 (N.D. I11.
1977) ("In the case of competing and overlapping statutes, legislative intent is most relia-
bly expressed in the statute where the attention to detail and to precision are the most
manifest.").
52. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974).
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islature53-resolves this contradition. The presumptions against implied
repeal and in favor of specific over general are rebuttable and should
merely be "kept in mind" when interpreting legislative intent.'
Close analysis of cases relying on the specific remedy rule reveals that
courts do not distinguish between the rule and implied repeal."
Whatever the semantic differences between the rules, their effect is the
same: a law that fits certain facts will not be applied to those facts.
II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
When two laws cover the same activity, one more specifically than the
other, congressional intent to displace the more general law will probably
be found.56 This presumption fails where Congress expressed its intent
to leave the general law intact.5 7 Congress manifested its intent that the
CEA antimanipulation provision leave the antitrust laws intact58 with
respect to private defendants.59
53. See, eg., Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975); Sinclair Ref. Co. v.
Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 204-08 (1962); Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (9th Cir.
1981).
"[E]ven the most basic general principles of statutory construction must yield to clear
contrary evidence of legislative intent." National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n
of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974); see Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S.
83, 88 (1940).
54. See District of Columbia v. Orleans, 406 F.2d 957, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
55. To assume ... that the mere passage of a specific statute covering an area of
conduct also regulated by a more general statue limits enforcement of the gen-
eral statute by carving out an exception to it, is, in eflect, to accomplish a partial
repeal of the general statute. Repeals by implication are not favored; effect
should be given to overlapping statutes if possible.
United States v. Burnett, 505 F.2d 815, 816 (9th Cir. 1974), cer. denied, 420 U.S. 966
(1975); see, eg., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 673 F.2d 507, 512-13 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
United States v. Hansen, 566 F. Supp. 162, 164 n.3 (D.D.C. 1983), aft'd, 772 F.2d 940
(D.C. Cir. 1985), cert denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1986) (No. 85-973).
56. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
58. See Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22, 28-29 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 527 (1985); Goldschmidt v. Hunt, 556 F. Supp. 123, 123-24 (N.D. Tex.
1983); Strax v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 936, 94041 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Pol-
lock v. Citrus Assocs., 512 F. Supp. 711, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). But see Smith v. Groover,
468 F. Supp. 105, 116-17 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
59. If the defendant is an exchange acting in conformity with rules approved or sub-
ject to approval by the CFTC or acting pursuant to CFTC direction or suggestion or
acting in a manner later ratified by the CFTC, a different conclusion would be warranted.
For example, exchange action or inaction in the face of market manipulation is an exer-
cise of self-regulation as the exchanges are statutorily mandated to provide for the pre-
vention of market manipulation. See 7 U.S.C. § 7(d) (1982); see also id. § 12a(9). Such
decisions are immune from antitrust attack under Silver. See supra notes 39-46 and ac-
companying text. Because exchange rules and regulations must be submitted to and ap-
proved by the CFTC, 7 U.S.C. § 12 (1982), action in accordance with those policies must
be provided antitrust immunity so that the CEA can operate effectively. Cf. Gordon v.
New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 689-90 (1975) (securities case).
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A. The Legislative History
The hearings on the 1974 amendments to the CEA show that Congress
wanted the antitrust laws to apply to the commodities industry. At first,
the House considered giving the industry antitrust immunity.60 Early in
the consideration of the bills, however, the legislators dropped this anti-
trust exemption. 61 The House committee did not want to extend anti-
trust immunity beyond that already provided by Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange,62 which they believed adequately protected the industry's abil-
ity to self-regulate.63 That case provided for the implied repeal of the
antitrust laws when necessary to make the regulatory act work.'
Thus, rather than providing immunity, its drafters tried to reconcile
the CEA with the antitrust laws.65 The final version of the "antitrust
provision" directed the CFTC to consider "the public interest to be pro-
tected by the antitrust laws and endeavor to take the least anticompeti-
tive means of achieving the objectives ' 66 and policies of the CEA.67
Evidence of congressional intent also comes from statements concern-
ing the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the CFTC.68  The Senate committee
considering the bill made it clear that the antitrust laws were to continue
60. See H.R. 11,955, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 106 (1973) (adding § 17 to the CEA).
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a contract market, registered fu-
tures association established pursuant to section 15 of this Act, or person regis-
tered under the provisions of this Act who is acting pursuant to and in
accordance with... any bylaw, rule, or regulation of a contract market which
has been required or specifically approved by the Commission as provided in
this Act, shall be exempt from the antitrust laws of the United States ....
Id. (CEA § 17(a)). Subsection (b) of the new § 17 directed the Commission to consider
antitrust policies when approving or requiring any exchange bylaw. See id. § 106.
61. See H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1974).
62. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
63. The Committee considering the bill was relying on statements made to it by the
Justice Department during considerations of H.R. 11,955. See H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1974) (citing Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357
(1963)). Any statutory exemption would be unnecessary because Supreme Court deci-
sions already provided antitrust immunity for Commission-mandated activity, see id.,
and for those exchange activities approved by the Commission, so long as they are neces-
sary to make the Act work, cf Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)
(securities case).
64. See supra text accompanying note 46.
65. Subsection (b) of § 17 was retained by the House, and certain changes were made
in the Senate. For a complete discussion of the progression of the antitrust provision
through Congress, see Johnson, Antitrust Under the CFTC Act: An Ounce of Prevention
., 20 Antitrust Bull. 441 (1975).
66. 7 U.S.C. § 19 (1982).
67. Id. The antitrust provision and its history are not directly relevant to this Note
because violations of the CEA's antimanipulation provisions do not involve Commission-
mandated or approved activity. See Pollock v. Citrus Assocs., 512 F. Supp. 711, 716
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). It does, however, shed light on the concern Congress had about the
antitrust laws during consideration of the CFTCA. See Strax v. Commodity Exch., Inc.,
524 F. Supp. 936, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Pollock, 512 F. Supp. at 716.
68. The CFTC was given exclusive jurisdiction over commodity transactions. See 7
U.S.C. § 2(a)(ii) (1982).
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to apply to the futures trading industry.69
The most extensive testimony concerning the antitrust laws came from
Representative Peter Rodino, Chairman of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee, who stressed the close relationship that the futures industry shared
with the antitrust laws.70 He feared that the clause granting exclusive
jurisdiction to the CFTC might be interpreted as stripping the district
courts' antitrust jurisdiction. 1 At his urging, the final version of the ex-
clusive jurisdiction provision protected the federal courts' antitrust
jurisdiction. 2
It has been argued that because Congress had considered and rejected
bills authorizing treble damages for CEA violations, 3 Congress intended
69. Senator Talmadge, Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture, said:
In establishing this Commission, it is the committee's intent to give it exclu-
sive jurisdiction over those areas delineated in the act. This will assure that the
affected entities--exchanges, traders, customers, et cetera-will not be subject
to conflicting agency rulings. However, it is not the intent of the committee to
exempt persons in the futures trading industry from existing laws or regulations
such as the antitrust laws ....
120 Cong. Rec. 30,459 (1974) (statement of Sen. Talmadge).
70. See Hearings on S, 2485, S. 2578, S. 2837, and H.. 13113 before the Senate
Agriculture and Forrestry Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1974).
The nature of commodity futures markets demonstrates the peculiar intimacy
and special relationship these markets have with the fundamental national legal,
economic, and social policies expressed in our antitrust laws since enactment of
the Sherman Act in 1890....
... By insuring the applicability of the antitrust laws to the commodity future
industry, the purposes of these laws, "the unrestrained interaction of competi-
tive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress," . . . will be pro-
moted as well as protected.
[I]n successive years, wheat, soybeans, and corn have been subjected to
anticompetitive and monopolistic practices in commodity markets that have
significantly contributed to food prices charged consumers. These develop-
ments indicate the urgency of apply [sic] antitrust principles to commodity mar-
kets unequivocally ....
Id. at 258-59 (citation omitted) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
4 (1958)).
71. See Hearings on S. 2485, S. 2578, S. 2837, and HR. 13113 before the Senate
Agriculture and Forrestry Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 259-60 (1974). Though the exclu-
sive jurisdiction section "saved" the jurisdictions of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and other regulatory agencies, no provision had been inserted to save the
antitrust jurisdictions of the federal courts. Id.
72. "Nothing in this section shall supersede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on
courts of the United States or any State." 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
73. See S. 2837, 93d Cong., 1st Sss., § 505(b) (1973); S. 2578, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 20 (1973). The defendants in Strobl referred to "three bills" and cited to Smith v.
Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 113 (N.D. Ill. 1979) for support. See Brief of Defendants-
Appellants/Cross-Appellees at 40, Strobl v. New York Stock Exch., 768 F.2d 22 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 527 (1985). Smith refers to the above mentioned bills and
H.R. 11,955, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 17(3) (1973). See Smith, 468 F. Supp. at 113 n.3.
The cite is apparently intended to refer to § 106 of the bill, which proposed to amend § 17
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to eliminate antitrust causes of action.74 However, these rejections are of
little relevance to whether Congress intended antitrust laws to apply to
commodities market manipulation.75 The legislative history reveals that
courts should give the antitrust laws full effect.76 The rejections of treble
damages for CEA violations do not weaken this conclusion, and thus
should not be used to imply the repeal of the antitrust laws.
B. The Failure of the Securities Exchange Act Analogy
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)77 prohibits stock mar-
ket manipulation78 just as the CEA prohibits manipulation of the com-
modity markets.7 9 In cases in which plaintiffs have alleged violations of
both the 1934 Act's manipulation provisions and the Sherman Act based
on the same conduct, the antitrust claims have been dismissed,80 in part
based on the specific remedy rule.81 Relying on these decisions, one
court has held that since the CEA contains a similar antimanipulation
provision, antitrust claims grounded in commodity market manipulation
must likewise be dismissed.82 However, the analogy between the securi-
ties and commodities laws is flawed.
Evidence exists that Congress intended that the antitrust laws not ap-
ply to stock market manipulation.8 3 This evidence includes a clause in
the 1934 Act limiting the total amount of damages that may be awarded
in securities cases,8 4 the interpretation of inconsistencies between the se-
curities acts and the antitrust laws 5 in light of that damage limiting
of the CEA. However, the section does not refer to treble damages. Instead, it proposes
an antitrust exemption. See supra note 60.
74. See Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22, 28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 527 (1985).
75. Id. at 28.
76. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
77. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)) (hereinafter cited as 1934 Act).
78. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i-78j, 78o(c) (1982).
79. See supra note 10.
80. See In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 427 F. Supp. 1208, 1210 (N.D. I11.
1977); Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 1186, 1190 (N.D. 111. 1970), affid in part
and rev'd in part on other grounds, 509 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
943 (1976).
81. See Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 1186, 1190 (N.D. I11. 1970), affid in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 509 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 943 (1976).
82. See Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 116-17 (N.D. I11. 1979).
83. See Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 1186, 1190-92 (N.D. I11. 1970),
affid in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 509 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976). The resolution of the issue of whether the antitrust laws
should apply to securities market manipulation actions is beyond the scope of this Note.
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982) ("[N]o person permitted to maintain a suit ...
under the provisions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one
or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act
complained of.").
85. The 1934 Act limits remedial recovery of actual damages, see id., while the anti-
trust laws provide treble damages, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982). The 1934 Act's statute of
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clause,16 and the idea that stock market manipulation schemes had never
been within the coverage of the Sherman Act.87 This is the kind of af-
firmative intent necessary to impliedly repeal the antitrust laws. How-
ever, not only does no such affirmative intent to repeal exist in the
commodities context, but the evidence of intent actually points towards
keeping the antitrust laws intact.
The CEA contains no language resembling that found in the damage
limiting provisions of the 1934 Act. The 1934 Act limits the total
amount recoverable under the Act and other statutes to actual dam-
ages.88 Though recovery under the CEA is limited to actual damages,89
recovery under other statutes is not limited in the CEA.90 Certainly, the
legislative history of the CEA's damage limiting section supports no
other interpretation. 9 If Congress had wanted the CEA to have the
same limiting effect as the 1934 Act, that language could have been ad-
ded to the CEA. Thus, the damage limiting provisions of the CEA and
the 1934 Act must be construed differently.
The inconsistencies between the securities and antitrust laws92 used to
dismiss antitrust claims brought with securities actions93 are insignificant
in commodities cases.94 The inconsistencies only mattered in the securi-
limitations is "one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and...
three years after such violation," 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1982), while the antitrust statute of
limitations is four years, 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1982).
86. See Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 1186, 1192 (N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 509 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 943 (1976).
87. See id. at 1191-92.
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982). See supra note 84.
Congress' intent that this section limit awards from other statutes is certain: "This
subsection reserves rights and remedies existing outside of those provided in the Act, but
limits the total amount recoverable to the amount of actual damages." H.R. Rep. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); see Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 1186,
1192 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1970), ajfd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 509 F.2d 1287
(7th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976) (quoting same passage).
89. See 7 U.S.C. § 25(a) (1982). This section makes actual damages (as well as the
arbitration and reparation proceedings) "the exclusive remedies under this chapter avail-
able to any person who sustains loss as a result of any alleged violation of this chapter."
Id. § 25(a)(2).
90. Section 22 of the CEA, which establishes the statutory private right of action,
lacks language limiting the recovery of "a total amount in excess of his actual damages on
account of the act complained of." See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
91. The legislative history accompanying CEA § 22 is sparse. More than anything, it
appears to be at attempt to codify the private right of action found in Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). In that case, the Supreme
Court specifically refused to resolve the issue of what measure of damages would be avail-
able under the CEA's private right of action. See id. at 395. Congress responded soon
after the decision with § 22. See H.R. Cong. Rep. No. 964, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 53,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3871, 4071.
92. See supra note 85.
93. See Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 1186, 1192 (N.D. 111. 1970), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 509 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 943 (1976).
94. See Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22, 30 (2d Cir.), cerL denied,
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ties context because "Congress could not have intended that the damage
restrictions contained in the carefully drawn prohibitions against market
manipulation in the 1934 Act could be evaded and effectively nullified by
the simple expedient of invoking the Sherman Act."95 In themselves, the
inconsistencies caused no problem.96 It was only in conjunction with the
damage-limiting provision that they became prominent; they served as
evidence of legislative intent that the antitrust laws should not apply. In
stark contrast with the securities laws, the CEA has no damage-limiting
provision. 97 The inconsistencies, without more, cannot work an implied
repeal.
Finally, no antitrust cause of action had ever existed for schemes to
manipulate the stock market. 9 This is not true of commodities mar-
kets.99 In the absence of any other justification for not applying the anti-
trust laws, it is certain that a Sherman Act cause of action may be
brought for commodity market manipulation schemes.
Thus, the analogy between the 1934 Act and the CEA for the purposes
of the specific remedy rule fails. Affirmative evidence concerning the
CEA,100 in addition to other crucial distinctions between it and the 1934
Act, shows that the same treatment for both with respect to implied re-
peal of the antitrust laws is inappropriate.
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In enacting the CEA, Congress was motivated by the fear of monopoli-
zation and the need to keep the markets free from artificial interfer-
ence. 01 To this extent, the antimanipulation provisions and the antitrust
106 S. Ct. 527 (1985); Pollock v. Citrus Assocs., 512 F. Supp. 711, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
But see Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 116 (N.D. I11. 1979) (antitrust claims dis-
missed in part because of similar inconsistencies between the CEA and antitrust laws).
The CEA provides for actual damages, see 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) (1982), and has only a
two-year statute of limitations, see id. § 25(c).
95. Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 1186, 1192 (N.D. Ill. 1970), affld in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 509 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 943 (1976).
96. See Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22, 30 (2d Cir), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 527 (1985); Pollock v. Citrus Assocs., 512 F. Supp. 711, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a "party may ... state as many
separate claims ... as he has regardless of consistency .... ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
97. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
98. See Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 1186, 1191-92 (N.D. Ill. 1970),
affid in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 509 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976).
99. The antitrust laws have traditionally been applied to commodity market manipu-
lation. See Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1923); United States v. Patten,
226 U.S. 525, 541-43 (1913); Miller v. New York Produce Exch., 550 F.2d 762, 766 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353, 356-57 (7th Cir.
1938).
100. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text for the legislative history showing
that the antitrust laws were to apply to commodities activities.
101. A resolution within the Act sets forth the purpose of the statute:
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The statutes' damages provisions differ because the CEA provides only
for actual damages while the antitrust laws provide for treble damages. 1°3
This greater measure of damages, however, does not conflict but merely
supplements and furthers the policies of the CEA by providing an added
deterrent."m Treble damages can be a valuable weapon in the an-
timanipulation arsenal.'0 5
Transactions in commodities involving the sale thereof for future delivery as
commonly conducted on boards of trade and known as "futures" are affected
with a national public interest .... The transactions and prices of commodities
on such boards of trade are susceptible to excessive speculation and can be
manipulated, controlled, cornered or squeezed, to the detriment of the producer
or the consumer and the persons handling commodities and the products and
byproducts thereof in interstate commerce, rendering regulation imperative for
the protection of such commerce and the national public interest therein.
7 U.S.C. § 5 (1982).
102. "As price manipulation also violates antitrust laws, none of [the antimanipula-
tion] provisions conflicts with the purposes and standards of the antitrust laws." Strobl v.
New York Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22, 28 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 106 S. Ct. 527
(1985).
The laws are not completely coextensive, however. Though the antitrust laws require a
conspiracy to make out a valid claim for restraint of trade, see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), the
CEA does not, see 7 U.S.C. § 25(a) (1982). In addition, the standards of intent differ.
The antitrust laws require general intent, and would permit a criminal conviction where
the manipulator knows that the result (artificial prices) is reasonably forseeable from his
conduct. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445-46 (1978). The
CEA, on the other hand, requires specific intent. "[I]t must be proven that the accused
acted (or failed to act) with the purpose or conscious object of causing" an artificial price
or trend. In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, Inc., [1982-84 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,796, at 22,283 (C.F.T.C. 1982). The Commission was
not in full agreement in adopting this more rigorous standard of proof. The Enforcement
Division of the CFTC, which had brought the action, argued in favor of the knowledge
test, id. at 27,282, and Commissioner Stone was particularly surprised that the antitrust
standard was not adopted, id. at 27,304-05 (Stone, Comm'r, concurring). The majority
had quoted with favor passages from Gypsum, an antitrust case, and Cargill, Inc. v. Har-
din, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cerL denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972), in which the Court
described antitrust as a field "closely related" to commodities regulation, id. at 1166. See
Indiana Farm Bureau, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 27,282-
83. In addition, because the antitrust laws applied to commodity market manipulation
cases before the passage of the CEA, the adoption of the more restrictive standard makes
it appear that in passing the CEA Congress intended to weaken antimanipulation en-
forcement, a conclusion inconsistent with the legislative history. See id. at 27,304-05.
These divergent standards create an ironic and uncomfortable situation in which smaller
damage awards are granted in cases where the defendant acted with a more culpable state
of mind.
The concern with harmony stems from the issue of implied repeal. If there is a repug-
nancy between the two statutes, then the antitrust laws will be considered repealed. See
supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
103. Compare 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) (1982) (actual) with 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) (treble).
This inconsistency was relied on in part by the court in Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp.
105, 116 (N.D. Ill. 1979) in dismissing an antitrust claim for commodity market manipu-
lation. However, the court's analysis was mistaken. See supra note 95.
104. 2 T. Russo, Regulation of the Commodities Futures and Options Markets
§ 19.13, at 19-45 (1984).
105. Treble damages deter violations of the antitrust laws, see American Soe'y of
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Though Congress has rejected bills authorizing treble damages for
CEA violations,"' no recognized policy militates against such awards in
commodity cases. Indeed, courts have already allowed plaintiffs to pur-
sue claims alternate to their CEA causes of action that could provide
punitive damages. In one case, the CFTC stated that an action for unfair
and deceptive practices in the sale of commodities brought by the state
attorney general under a state consumer protection statute was not pre-
empted even though the state statute provided for treble damages. 107 The
Commission reasoned that the statute would not conflict with the com-
modities regulatory scheme because it was a "generalized prohibition
upon deceptive and fraudulent activities,"'' 08 not an effort to regulate
commodity activity. 109
In addition to consumer protection statutes, courts have allowed de-
frauded investors to plead common law fraud in the alternative to their
CEA antifraud provision claims. 10 Some innovative plaintiffs have even
successfully pleaded Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO)"' violations for commodity fraud and market manipula-
tion,' 12 and RICO provides for treble damages." 3
Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575 (1982), punish antitrust viola-
tors, see Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc. 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981), compen-
sate injured parties, see Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977), and
counterbalance the difficulty of maintaining a private antitrust lawsuit by creating "pri-
vate attorneys general," see id. at 745-46; Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,
429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977).
106. See supra note 74.
107. See Massachusetts v. Lloyd, Carr & Co., [1977-80 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 20,561, at 22,297 (Mass. 1978).
108. Id. at 22,296-97.
109. See id. The courts are split on the issue of allowing claims for commodity fraud
and manipulation brought under state consumer fraud statutes. Compare id. (state con-
sumer protection act not preempted by CEA) and Singer v. Clayton Brokerage, Inc.,
[1980-82 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,335, at 25,617-18 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1981) (CEA does not deprive state court of jurisdiction to hear claim predicated
upon state Deceptive Practices Act) with Haines v. First Commodity Corp., [1980-82
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,088, at 24,393-94 (Mass. 1980) (state
consumer protection statute preempted by CEA) and Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Hun-
sucker, 38 N.C. App. 414, 417, 420-21, 248 S.E.2d 567, 568, 570 (1978) (same). The split
concerns the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC. The question is whether these statutes
infringe on the regulatory power of the Commission.
110. See, e.g., Kotz v. Bache Halsey Stuart Inc., 685 F.2d 1204, 1207-08 (9th Cir.
1982); Witzel v. Chartered Sys. Corp., 490 F. Supp. 343, 347-48 (D. Minn. 1980); Poplar
Grove Planting & Ref. Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 585, 592 (M.D. La.
1979); E.F. Hutton v. Lewis, 410 F. Supp. 416, 419 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
111. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1982)).
112. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1025 (1984); Vaccariello v. Financial Partners Brokerage, Ltd., [1982-84 Trans-
fer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) % 21,874, at 27,716 (N.D. IIl. 1983); Parnes v.
Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 21-22, 24 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Heinold Com-
modities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313-14 (N.D. Ill. 1979). But see Applegate
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) N
21,881, at 27,248 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (dismissing the RICO claim). For good discussions on
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Commentators have argued, however, that it is not wise to allow
RICO treble damage awards for "garden variety" fraud in commodity
transactions.11 4 Even these commentators expressly distinguish market
manipulation conspiracies though, arguing that market manipulation is
more serious than ordinary fraud and requires more threatening deter-
rents and more stringent punishment.' The two recent incidents dis-
cussed in the Introduction illustrate the strength of this distinction.
The 1976 potato market manipulation produced the largest default in
the history of commodities futures trading," 6 with devastating effects on
both producers and investors.' 7 The silver market failure similarly dis-
rupted the commodities markets with rippling effects on the entire na-
tional economy.1 18
The effects of market manipulation can be felt by everyone, from the
largest multinational corporation to the smallest consumer. Potential
manipulators should not be allowed to escape the deterrent effect of anti-
trust treble damages merely because the CEA provides a lesser deterrent.
Moreover, market manipulation in general has long been considered a
Sherman Act violation." 9 These factors all point to the conclusion that
the commodity markets deserve the extra protection from manipulation
that the Sherman Act provides.
CONCLUSION
Where conduct violates both the CEA antimanipulation provisions
and the antitrust laws, the injured party should be able to pursue recov-
ery under both statutes. In such a case, the policies of the two statutes do
not conflict, and therefore the antitrust laws are not impliedly repealed.
Moreover, the two laws are clearly designed to promote and protect the
same public policy: open competition unfettered by the imposition of any
unnatural forces. The importance of this policy led Congress to indicate
clearly that it wanted the antitrust laws to apply fully to the futures in-
dustry. This intent allows the antitrust laws to survive application of the
specific remedy rule.
Even with the current trend of restricting the antitrust laws, the Sher-
man Act still applies to price manipulation schemes as a powerful deter-
the use of civil RICO in commodity cases, see Sackheim, Leto & Friedman, Commodities
Litigation: The Impact of RICO, 34 DePaul L. Rev. 23 (1984) and Harvitt, Defrauded
Commodity Investors: What's in Their Futures?, 71 111. B.J. 496 (1983).
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
114. See Sackheim, Leto & Friedman, supra note 112, at 71-72. But see Harvitt, supra
note 112, at 500 (encouraging defrauded investors to use RICO and other causes of action
that would provide greater damage awards and longer statutes of limitation).
115. See Sackheim, Leto & Friedman, supra note 112, at 68.
116. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 99.
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rent. The commodities markets deserve and require this same
protection.
Alan Schacter
